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Abstract: We propose to define logicality of a simple notion as neces-
sary instantiation. (And then logicality of a complex notion as logica-
lity of all simple notions occurring in it.)
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Resumo: Propomos definir logicalidade de uma noção simples como
instanciação necessária. (E então logicalidade de uma noção complexa
como logicalidade de todas as noções simples nela ocorrendo.)
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1. Introduction
There seems to be a close link
between logicality and necessity;
and correlatively a close link
between empiricality and contin-
gency. Dramatically speaking, the
logical realm is the realm of neces-
sities, whereas the empirical re-
alm is the realm of contingencies.
(I mean logicality here in a broad
sense; some might prefer to say
‘logico-mathematicality’.)
The very existence of things or
of instances of kinds of things is,
typically, contingent in empirical
cases and necessary in logical ca-
ses. Thus a paradigmatic empi-
rical thing like the Eiffel Tower
might of course not have exis-
ted; and a paradigmatic empiri-
cal concept like the concept of dog
might not have had any instan-
ces. But a paradigmatic logical (or
if you like logico-mathematical)
thing like the empty set is no
doubt a necessary existent (at least
if it exists at all), and a paradig-
matic logical concept like identity
is necessarily instantiated.
One might then think of defi-
ning logicality as something like
this – necessary existence or ne-
cessary instantiation. However,
there are obvious counterexam-
ples. The concept [dog or non-
dog] is necessarily instantiated,
but not logical; and the con-
cept [identical and non-identical
with] is logical, but not necessa-
rily instantiated (indeed necessa-
rily uninstantiated).
But in such counterexamples
we artfully construct certain com-
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plex concepts. Perhaps we can still
use the idea above to define lo-
gicality for simples, and then so-
mehow extend the definition to
complexes? – I will argue in what
follows that indeed we can.
2. A definition of logicality
By an attributive notion I mean
a notion which may be ‘attribu-
ted’ or ‘applied’ to other notions
so as to form a proposition. Pos-
sible examples of attributive noti-
ons are: the notions expressed by
ordinary verbal expressions like
‘smokes’ or ‘is parallel to’; propo-
sitional ‘connectives’, such as the
notions expressed by ‘and’, ‘So-
crates believes that’, etc.; quantifi-
ers and other notions which pro-
duce propositions upon applica-
tion to notions which are themsel-
ves attributive – thus [Something],
[Every philosopher], etc.
By a substance-notion I mean a
notion which is not attributive.
Thus e.g. the notions expressed
by ‘Socrates’ and by ‘All men are
mortal’ are substance-notions.
I say that a notion is complex
if at least one other notion enters
into its constitution – thus e.g.
[white horse] is of course a com-
plex notion. And I say that a no-
tion is simple if it is not complex.
By saying that an attributive
notion is instantiated I mean that
there is some true proposition
consisting of the attributive no-
tion in question applied to some
notion or notions. Thus [white
horse] is instantiated, but [flying
horse] is not.
I will use also the concept of
the referent of a simple substance-
notion. (Different philosophers
may wish to define this in diffe-
rent ways. I do not exclude that
the referent be identified with the
simple substance-notion itself.)
By saying that a simple substance-
notion is instantiated, then, I mean
that its referent exists. (Again,
different philosophers – e.g. ‘ac-
tualists’ on one side, ‘possibilists’
on the other – may wish to inter-
pret this ‘exists’ in different ways.)
(We will not need to define ins-
tantiation for complex substance-
notions.)
We come finally to logica-
lity. Let s be any simple no-
tion (whether attributive notion
or substance-notion); we then de-
fine:
s is logical =df Necessarily, s is ins-
tantiated.
Necessity here is ‘metaphysical’
necessity.
Now no doubt it should be the
case that a complex notion is lo-
gical if and only if all the simple
notions occurring in it are logical.
(See BATCHELOR 2013, §§ 5–6.)
So given any complex notion x, we
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can define ‘x is logical’ as the con-
junction of all propositions [s is
logical] (in the sense already de-
fined) for s a simple notion occur-
ring in x. This completes the pre-
sently proposed definition of logi-
cality.
It should be emphasized here
that it would not be adequate to
define logical notions in general
(including complex ones) as neces-
sarily instantiated notions. (Thus
the title of the present note is el-
liptical (for the sake of lapida-
rity).) Indeed we have not even
defined instantiation for complex
substance-notions. But irrespec-
tively of that, there are obvi-
ous counterexamples with com-
plex attributive notions, as alre-
ady indicated above in § 1.
3. Agreement with customary
classification of specific notions
Now, how far does the presently
proposed definition of logicality
agree with the customary classifi-
cation of specific notions or clas-
ses of notions as logical or non-
logical? – Very far, it seems to me.
It will be enough to consider
simple notions, or reasonable can-
didates for being simple notions,
since the adequacy of our general
definition relative to the adequacy
of our definition of logicality for
simple notions is straightforward.
Let us begin with what are usu-
ally reckoned as being (plausibly
simple) logical notions.
The usual truth-functional con-
nectives negation, conjunction,
disjunction (or the Sheffer stroke
etc.) are obviously necessarily ins-
tantiated. E.g. if all men are mor-
tal then negation is instantiated
by [Not all men are mortal]; and
if not all men are mortal then ne-
gation is instantiated by [All men
are mortal]. Only a ‘falsum’ truth-
function, ⊥, would be a counte-
rexample; but surely it is implau-
sible to think that there is a sim-
ple notion here; it seems much
more plausible to think that ⊥(A)
should be defined as (say) A ∧ ¬A
(and similarly for the binary, ter-
nary etc. falsum connectives).
(Another way around an alle-
ged simple falsum would be to
re-define: s is logical =df Either
it is necessary that s is instantia-
ted or it is necessary that s is not
instantiated – or in other words:
Whether s is instantiated is not a
contingent matter. It may also be
argued on independent grounds
that this is, conceptually, a more
satisfactory definition: empirica-
lity (of a simple) is here, naturally,
equated to contingency of instanti-
ation, and logicality, which is the
contradictory of empiricality, is
thus equated to non-contingency of
instantiation. – The empirical re-
alm is the realm of contingencies,
and the logical realm the realm
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of non-contingencies. – Howe-
ver, it may also be argued on the
other side that this (slightly more
complex) reformulation is hardly
worth the trouble, since surely
there are no necessarily uninstan-
tiated simple notions, so that the
two formulations are in fact equi-
valent.)
Again, the universal and exis-
tential quantifiers, identity, me-
taphysical necessity and metaphy-
sical possibility – these are all ne-
cessarily instantiated.
(For someone who thinks that
there might be nothing at all, the
above-suggested definition of lo-
gicality would inadequately count
e.g. the existential quantifier as
non-logical. But the following
amended version would do, I sup-
pose: s is logical =df Necessarily:
if there is anything at all, then s
is instantiated. – But now, if it is
possible that there is exactly one
thing, and say the quantifier [At
least two things] is a simple no-
tion, then this definition would
still wrongly classify it as non-
logical. But of course it is much
more plausible to think that [At
least two things] is a complex no-
tion; and the same holds for the
other obvious putative countere-
xamples which might be given in
this connection.)
Also, if there are simple no-
tions of set-membership, empty
set, etc., or of natural numbers
and usual numerical relations etc.,
then these will count as logi-
cal by our definition, as they
should, given that as I said this
is meant as definition of logica-
lity in a broad sense (or ‘logico-
mathematicality’). (Assuming of
course standard ‘rigid’ rather than
eccentric ‘contingent’ Platonism.)
Coming now to simple notions
usually reckoned as not being lo-
gical notions, it seems clear that
they will indeed count as non-
logical by our definition. No
doubt simple empirical particu-
lars do not necessarily exist; no
doubt simple empirical properties
and relations of particulars are
not necessarily instantiated. And
there is no good reason that I
know of for thinking that there
are any simple empirical proposi-
tional connectives at all, let alone
necessarily instantiated ones; and
similarly for other supposed sim-
ple higher-order empirical noti-
ons.
(In another paper (BATCHE-
LOR 2011), I have suggested
another, quite differently motiva-
ted, definition of logicality. That
definition had some consequen-
ces (explicitly indicated in that
other paper, § 2) which some phi-
losophers have found too dras-
tic. The present definition has
no such consequences, and I hope
that others may find it more ac-
ceptable. As for my giving two
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different definitions of logicality, I
do not see any problem about it:
these are two different conditions
both of which, I conjecture, pick
out precisely what should count
as logical notions – no claim being
made in either case to an inevi-
table analysis leading to the uni-
que ‘essence’ of the idea of logi-
cality (which would be a hopeless
goal in my opinion). So there is no
problem if we have more than one
such condition; it would be a pro-
blem if we had less than one.)
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